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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***QW
Date: 11/26/2018 4:19 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

GUS H. SMALL, as and onJy as
Administrative Trustee of the Trust for
Richard Charles Bunzl and His Lineal
Descendants, The Trust for Suzanne Irene
Bunzl and Her Lineal Descendants, and The
Trust for the Lineal Descendants of Walter
Henry Bunzl; BUNZL TRUSTS
INVESTMENTS, LLC f/k/a Coronado
Investments, LLC; and BUNZL TRUST
PROPERTIES, LLC f/k/a Capital Piedmont
Partners, LLC,

CIVIL ACTION NO.
20 l 6CV280892

Bus. Case Div. 4

Plaintiffs,
V.

WILLIAM C. LANKFORD, JR. and
MOORE STEPHENS, TILLER, LLC,
Defendants.

ORDER REGARDING EXPERT DISCOVERY DISPUTE
The above styled matter is before the Court on a discovery dispute raised in
correspondence submitted to the Court regarding expert discovery. Specifically, Plaintiffs have
asserted objections to the following requests for the production of documents included in a
Subpoena Duces Tecum served upon Mary Radford, a testifying expert retained by Plaintiffs in
this action:

Request 6: Your entire file related to your expert engagement in the
above-styled lawsuit.

Request 7: Any and all correspondence (including emails, letters, text
messages, phone calls, etc.) you exchanged with counsel, parties,

witnesses, and non-parties pertaining to your engagement in the abovestyled lawsuit.
Request 10: Any drafts or working copies of any reports, memorandum,
or any other written report or summary of your opinions you formed in
your engagement in the above-styled lawsuit.
Request 11: Any and all written reports, opinions, drafts, summaries,
expert reports, or other memoranda you have drafted related to your
opinions or review of issues present in the above-styled lawsuit.
("Disputed Expert Requests").
In their response to the Disputed Expert Requests, Plaintiffs object on the basis they seek
"privileged opinion work product."! In correspondence exchanged between counsel and
submitted to the Court, Plaintiffs take the position that "[a]ny memoranda or drafts prepared by
Ms. Radford, or provided to Ms. Radford is protected by attorney work product" Related to this
discovery dispute Plaintiffs have also submitted privilege logs for correspondence, emails and
memoranda/research that have been withheld from production, referencing documents that
predate the filing of this action.
"The Georgia Civil Practice Act provides for 'discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.'" McKinnon v.
Smock, 264 Ga. 375, 376, 445 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1994) (citing O.C.G.A. §9-l l-26(b)(l)).
Plaintiffs' counsel's correspondence and privilege logs raise objections to the Disputed Requests
based on attorney client privilege and the work product doctrine. Notably,
the purpose of the work-product doctrine is different from that of the
attorney-client privilege. While the attorney-client privilege is intended to
protect the attorney-client relationship by protecting communications
between clients and attorneys, the work-product doctrine directly protects
the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without
concern that their work will be used against their clients.

Plaintiffs' Response and Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum to Mary Radford, p. 4.
Letter from Richard A. Wingate to Johannes S. kingma and Shannon M. Sprinkle (dated Oct. 31, 2018).

2

McKesson HBOC Inc. v. Adler, 254 Ga. App. 500, 503, 562 S.E.2d 809, 813 (2002) (citing
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1427-1428 (3rd
Cir.1991).
With respect to the assertion of the attorney-client privilege, O.C.G.A. §24-5-501 (a)(2)
"exclude[s] from evidence on grounds of public policy ... [c]ommunications between attorney and
client." Accordingly, only confidential communications between a party's counsel and their
client are covered under the privilege. Further, "[t]he attorney-client privilege extends only to
confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services
to the client." S. Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Ash, 192 Ga. App. 24, 28, 383 S.E.2d 579, 583
(1989). See also Georgia Cash Am., Inc. v. Strong, 286 Ga. App. 405, 413, 649 S.E.2d 548, 555
(2007) ("[A party's] suggestion that the fact that an attorney might have reviewed or commented
upon a document automatically protects the document under the attorney-client privilege is
unsupported by any authority and, in fact, conflicts with prior opinions by this Court").
As to the work product doctrine, O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-26(b)(3) provides:
Subject to paragraph (4) of this subsection [related to expert discovery], a
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under paragraph (I) of this subsection and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.

See also McKinnon v. Smock, 264 Ga. 375, 381 n. 2, 445 S.E.2d 526, 530 (1994) ("'Opinion
work product' has been described as including such items as an attorney's legal strategy,
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intended lines of proof, evaluation of the case's strengths and weaknesses, and the inference
drawn from interviews of witnesses") (citing Sporck v. Peil. 759 F.2d 312,316 (3rd Cir.1985)).
However, O.C.G.A. §9-l l-26(b)(3) is "subject to" paragraph 4 of §9-11-26 which
governs expert discovery and authorizes parties to obtain "[ d]iscovery of facts known and
opinions held by experts ... acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial", that is
otherwise discoverable, through a variety of methods including the production of documents. As
to the interplay between O.C.G.A. §9-l l-26(b)(3) and O.C.G.A. §9-l I-26(b)(4) and having
considered the Disputed Expert Requests at issue in the case at bar, the Court finds McKinnon
instructive:
Determining whether correspondence from an attorney to an expert is
protected from disclosure requires an evaluation of the interplay between
O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-26(b)(3), which protects opinion work product, and
O.C.G.A. § 9-l 1-26(b)(4), which perm.its discovery of the facts known
and opinions held by an expert ... Section 9-11-26(b)(3) and (b)(4) appear
in conflict when, as here, a party seeks material which originated with the
attorney representing the opposition and which may contain facts relied on
by the expert ...
The protection afforded opinion work product creat[ es] an environment in
which counsel [is] free to think dispassionately, reliably, and creatively
both about the law and the evidence in the case and about which strategic
approaches to the litigation are likely to be in [his] client's best
interests ... The protection shields an attorney's preparation from disclosure
because there is a "higher value" to be served in protecting the thought
processes of counsel ...
With these principles in mind, we conclude that (b )(3) is "subject to"
(b )(4) only to the extent of the first sentence of (b )(3 ). That is, one seeking
discovery of the facts known and opinions held by an expert acquired or
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial may do so without
exhibiting a substantial need for the material and establishing the undue
hardship that will result should the seeker have to employ other means to
develop the evidence. However, discovery seeking the facts known and
opinions held by the expert is subject to (b)(3)'s provision against the
disclosure of "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinion, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation." Thus, correspondence from an attorney to an expert is
4

protected from disclosure to the extent that the correspondence contains
the opinion work product of the attorney. Should a dispute arise over
whether a particular document does contain protected work product
material, the trial court must conduct an in camera review to ensure that
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's
attorney or representative are not disclosed.
McKinnon, 264 Ga. at 376-78 (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Stephens v. Tr. For
Pub. Land, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("Plaintiff argues that the materials
withheld constitute privileged work product because Mr. Dabney was operating, not in his
capacity as Plaintiffs expert, but rather in his capacity as consultant. While the Court appreciates
the distinction Plaintiff attempts to draw, courts have generally held that where an individual
serves as both an expert and as a consultant, documents which are related to the expert's role as
an expert must be produced, and that any ambiguity as to the role played by the expert when
reviewing or generating documents should be resolved in favor of the party seeking discovery").
Importantly, the burden of establishing the existence of a privilege rests on the party
asserting the privilege. See Georgia Cash Am., Inc. v. Strong, 286 Ga. App. 405,412,649 S.E.2d
548, 554 (2007); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Conkle, 226 Ga. App. 34, 46, 486 S.E.2d 180, 191
(1997). Moreover, Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.5 provides:
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming
that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial
preparation material, the patty shall:
a. Expressly make the claim; and
b. Describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible
things not produced or disclosed and do so in a manner that, without

revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other
parties to assess such claim.
(Emphasis added).
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Here, having considered the correspondence exchanged between counsel and the large
number of documents being withheld according to the privilege logs provided, the breadth of the
assertion of the attorney-client and work product privileges in this case is troubling and raises a
concern that the analysis that went into the assertion of the privileges was not very thorough.
Similarly, on their face the scope of the Disputed Expert Requests appears broad (e.g., the
expert's

"entire

file

related

to

[the]

expert

engagement",

"any

and

all

correspondence ... exchanged with counsel", etc.) such that Defendants would be well served to
consider tailoring their requests to more narrowly state the discoverable documents being
requested.
In the final analysis, the distinctions between discoverable expert materials and
documents protected under the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine are not
particularly complicated and counsel should be able to make an appropriate distinction. Further,
motions to compel what ultimately may be a sizeable number of documents could prove to be
time consuming and very expensive for all parties, Indeed, if Defendants have to file motions to
compel and the Court finds a privilege was not properly asserted as to a large number of
documents, the case for an award of attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. §9-11-37 would likely be a
strong one.
Given all of the above and in an effort to promptly and more efficiently address this
discovery dispute, the Court orders as follows:
Defendants, within five (5) days of the entry of this order, shall reconsider and, if/as
necessary, tailor their Disputed Expert Requests.
Thereafter and within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this order, Plaintiffs/Ms.
Radford, shall supplement their production and/or amend and supplement their
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related privilege logs with the guidance of and in accordance to the above legal
authorities, including describing the nature of the documents or communications
being withheld with sufficient detail to enable the other parties and the Court to assess
the privilege claimed with respect to each document withheld from production.
Thereafter if any dispute remains as to the expert discovery sought following
Plaintiffs/Ms. Radford's supplemental production and/or amended/supplemented
privilege logs, counsel for the patties shall meet and confer within thirty (30) days of
the entry of this order.
If any dispute remains as to the expert discovery sought following such conferral,
Defendants may thereafter, if they deem it necessary, proceed with a motion to
compel as appropriate. If necessary, disputed documents shall be submitted to the
Court for in camera review.

SO ORDERED thi~day of November, 2018.

J

0
~·~
~NJ. GOER,JUDG ~

F;to:ounty Superior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Served on registered service contacts through eFileGA
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